What Brought Down Daoud’s Careful Manipulation of Soviet and American Aid?

In the midst of the Cold War, the USSR and the US competed against each other to win over any neutral state. One of the main means of influencing a state’s political position in the polarized Cold War world consisted of financial and in some cases military aid. Afghanistan under Prime Minister, Dauod, utilized its neutral political position to maximize the inflow of aid into its domestic economy and thus sustaining it. The aid coming from the two superpowers consisted of infrastructure, education and military support. The approaches of the USSR and the US differed in many ways. In the end, the Soviet efforts won over the Afghan government due to the Pashtunistan conflict. Overall, Daoud managed to balance the influx of Soviet and American aid to modernize Afghanistan to his best abilities, but a territorial conflict with Pakistan forced Daoud and the Afghan government to favor the Soviets over the Americans.

In a way by taking advantage of the Soviet and American Cold War rivalry, Daoud managed to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure but at the cost of destabilizing and weakening its domestic economy. By the 1960s, foreign aid made up more than 40% of the Afghan state budget[1]. It was estimated in the early 1960s that the US was spending close to15 dollars per Afghan[2]. Overall, the USSR invested approximately 700 million dollars while the US invested about 300 million dollars[3]. By letting such a big volume of foreign aid flow into the domestic Afghan economy, Daoud fostered a high dependence on an external source of financing. Most of the welfare and social policies implemented by the Afghan government in the 50s and the 60s was heavily subsidized by American and Soviet money. This high dependence did not allow the Afghan economy to develop in a sustainable matter. In 1968, a “Time” article mentioned that: “both Moscow and Washington have come to feel that the Afghans must do more to help themselves and bring to an end a situation in which 80 % of development funds comes from foreign sources[4].”

Despite deteriorating the Afghan economy, Daoud’s manipulation of the Cold War rivalry resulted in many projects that benefited Afghanistan. The USSR built an airport in Kabul while the US built one in Kandahar. Additionally, both superpowers constructed grand highways including the world’s largest road tunnel[5]. Most of the USSR’s roadways focused on the North and thus connected Afghanistan’s major cities to Soviet territories. The US, on the other hand, built roads in the South to provide access to India and Pakistan, a US ally[6]. In addition, the USSR supplied Afghanistan with oil and built grain elevators and bakeries in an effort to stimulate the Afghan economy by creating jobs[7].

The cooperation of Soviet and American aid orchestrated by Daoud lasted for approximately two decades. Some major problems arose. The Helmand Project originally begun as a partnership between the Afghan, Japanese and German governments in the 1930s, but the political circumstances of World War II halted the project. In 1945, the Afghan government decided to re-launch the Helmand project with the help of an American company, the Morrison-Knudsen. The project was significant due to its grandeur. The series of irrigation canals built as part of this endeavor were supposed to attract the nomadic population of Afghanistan to settle and to cultivate the land in the Helmand Valley. The Helmand Valley project failed and left Afghanistan in a large debt. In order to go through with the project the Afghan government took out a 21 million dollar loan from the Export-Import-Bank in Washington, DC. The project was unsuccessful due to a lot of factors. The main factor consisted of the quality of the soil. After attempting to farm the newly irrigated land, the settled nomads found their old ways to be more financially sustainable[8]. In addition to the Helmand Valley Project, despite doubling the number of schools in three years in Afghanistan, the literacy rate was 7% and only 12% school-age children attended a school. Even though the number of doctors in Afghanistan increased at the time the ratio of doctors to Afghans was 1 to25,000[9].

Though many destabilizing factors played a role in tarring Daoud’s policy of playing off of the Soviet-American rivalry, the issue of Pashtunistan tipped the balance between the American and Soviet support that Daoud sustained during most of his 1953 to 1963 rule. Shortly after gaining their independence, Pakistan declared the Durand Line, a boundary used by the British which separated British India and Afghanistan, as its official international border with Afghanistan[10]. Afghanistan supported the claim made by the Pathan people to create an autonomous state, Pashtunistan, on the land of the Durand Line[11].To aid in the creation of Pashtunistan and to defend Afghanistan from a potential armed conflict with Pakistan, Daoud needed to strengthen this army. In 1944, the Afghan government asked the US for military support; the request was denied. The Afghan government kept requesting US military aid unsuccessfully up until the early 1950s. After many attempts, a Loya Jirga, Afghan Grand Assembly, accepted Soviet military aid in 1955[12]. Additionally, in 1956 Daoud received a 500 million dollar loan from the Soviet Union to fund the modernization and the strengthening of the Afghan army[13]. These decisions marked the end of the neutral Afghanistan era. After accepting a large amount of military aid from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan distanced itself from the US. The closure of the Pashtunistan issue also marked the end of Daoud’s first reign over Afghanistan.

Daoud’s first ten year reign is marked by his ability to balance and control the relationship between the US and the USSR in favor of his nation. Through his policies, Daoud improved Afghan infrastructure immensely, but he let his country rely on too much foreign aid thus leaving Afghanistan unable to take care of itself. Additionally, while, many projects such as the Kandahar and the Kabul airports were successful, this period of time was not unmarked by failure. The Helmand Valley wasted a lot of Afghan financial resources and did not produce any results. Lastly, Daoud failed to retain Afghanistan’s neutrality in a political conflict, Pashtunistan; Afghanistan’s position on the Pashtunistan issue ruined the balance of the American and Soviet aid in Afghanistan.

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[1] Jonathan Goodhand, "Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan"

[2] “Afghanistan: Two-Way Stretch," Time, July 14, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,87602,00.html.

[3] "Afghanistan: Kingly Accomplishment," Time, December 3, 1965, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,842252,00

[4] "Afghanistan: History v. Progress," Time, September 20, 1968, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,838742,00

[5] "Afghanistan: Kingly Accomplishment," Time, December 3, 1965, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,842252,00

[6] "Afghanistan: The High-Wire Man," Time, October 5, 1959, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,89427,00.html

[7] "Afghanistan: Toward the Khyber," Time, September 17, 1956, , http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,893546,00.html

[8] Omar Zakhiwal, "The Helmand Valley Project," Institute for Afghan Studies

[9] "Afghanistan: History v. Progress," Time, September 20, 1968, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,838742,00

[10] Walid Majid, "Prime Minister Daoud's Relationship with Washington (1953-1963)," Institue for Afghan Studies”

[11] “Afghanistan: Two-Way Stretch," Time, July 14, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,87602,00.html.

[12] Walid Majid, "Prime Minister Daoud's Relationship with Washington(1953-1963)," Institue for Afghan Studies”

[13] "Afghanistan: Toward the Khyber," Time, September 17, 1956, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,893546,00.html

Arming Rebels

With the recent upheaval in Libya and the United States government’s decision to participate in a coalition to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and make select bombing raids aimed to help Libyan rebels, many questions have arisen about aiding rebels. These questions often reference American aid in Afghanistan prior to September 11^th, 2001. Some people claim that the United States actually funded the Taliban, contributing to their rise. To what extent did US involvement in Afghanistan in the 20^th century contribute to the rise of the Taliban? Though the movement began in universities build by Americans decades earlier and the US funded Afghanistan’s mujahidin, the US government never directly funded the Taliban, though its actions in the region may have contributed to the Taliban’s rise.

In the 1950’s, the Soviet Union was funding large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, hoping to curry favor with the government and people in the fight to spread communism. The US quickly realized the Soviet Union’s intentions and fought back by drastically increasing the amount of aid they gave to Afghanistan. A large portion of this aid came in the form of education. The US government sent professors from top American schools to new universities in Afghanistan as consultants to reform the educational system. Though the US went in with intentions of promoting freedom and democracy, their plans backfired forty years later.

The Taliban movement began among university students as dissatisfaction with the mujahidin government. The US had funded several groups of the mujahidin during the Soviet Invasion in hopes that the “holy warriors” would drive out the Russians. At the end of the decade, the Americans’ plan worked in that the Soviets withdrew all troops from Afghanistan. Yet the “coalition government” formed by tenuous alliances between mujahidin leaders never fully functioned. The word “Taliban” comes from Pashtun for “student.” The Taliban were originally a group of radicalized students, many of whom came from universities built in Afghanistan by the Americans, who wanted a working government and a secure population.

In this way, American funding created an intellectual elite who defied American principles. The Taliban did consolidate power for a centralized government, but they also instituted a reign of terror with their brutality.

Though the US did not directly fund the Taliban in the 1990’s, it did arm the mujahidin in the later 1980’s. Some people cite the mujahidin as the original source for the Taliban, interpreting this relationship as the US promoting the rise of the Taliban would be wrong. One of the factions of the mujahidin, funded by the US during the Soviet invasion, did morph into the Taliban in the early 1990’s—the two groups shared some leaders, members, and ideologies. And the Taliban gained ground quickly, seizing control of Afghanistan in just a few years. Yet one of their biggest rivals was another former mujahidin group, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, Afghan hero idolized for fighting against the Soviets and later against the Taliban.

Thus any claim that US funding of the mujahidin was essentially funding the Taliban can be countered with the fact that US funding of the mujahidin was also funding those who fought against the Taliban. Besides, most of this funding had stopped after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

An American think-tank official said of Libya, “you gotta go with the rebels you got.” Whether he is right or wrong in this case, United States aid in Afghanistan did not lead directly to the rise of the Taliban. Of course, however, Libya is a different situation altogether.

Historical Summary and Analysis of Afghanistan up to 1950

After years of Mogul and Safavid rule, in the mid-1750’s Ahmed Shah Durrani consolidated the Afghan kingdom which stretched from the Amu Darya to the Arabian Sea and from East of Mashad to Delhi in the West at its height. George Foster, a well-traveled British East India Company official, described the relationship between the Afghan Pushtoons and their rulers:

“The government of the Afghans must ever receive a weighty bias from the genius of their ruler, and the degree of authority he may possess. But when not constrained, as in the present reign, by some extraordinary power or capacity of the prince, they disperse into societies, and are guided by the ruder principles of the feudal system. Conformably to this system, the different chieftains usually reside in fortified villages, where they exercise an acknowledged, though moderate, sway over their vassals, and yield a careless obedience to the orders of government. Rarely any appeal is made to the head of state, except in cases which may involve a common danger; when I have seen the authority of the Shah interposed with success.

Fifty years later, Montstuart Elphinstone, another British East India Company official, compared the Afghan kingdom to Scotland: “the direct power of the King over the towns and the country immediately around; the precarious submission of the nearest clans, and the independence of the remote ones; the inordinate power and faction of the nobility most connected with the court; and the relations borne by all the great lords to the crown. . . There is reason to fear that the societies into which the nation is divided, possess within themselves a principle of repulsion and disunion, too strong to be overcome, except by such a force as, while it united the whole into one solid body, would crush and obliterate the features of every one of the parts. . . the internal government of the tribes answers its end so well, that the utmost disorders of the royal government never derange its operations, nor disturb the lives of the people. A number of organized and high-spirited republics are ready to defend their rugged country against a tyrant; and are able to defy the feeble efforts of a party in a civil war.”

He described the people: “Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighborhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit”

Afghanistan’s issues with the British began in the late 1820’s: concerned about growing Russian influence, the British told the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, “to watche more closely than has hitherto been attempted the progress of events in Afghanistan and to counteract the progress of Russian influence.” The British in India took this mission very seriously, invading Afghanistan in 1838. Auckland aimed “to raise up an insurmountable and . . . lasting barrier to all encroachments from the Westward, and to establish a basis for the extension and maintenance of British influence throughout po9oCentral Asia.” Afghanistan was to be a buffer state.

In the first Anglo-Afghan war from 1838 to 1841, the British replaced Afghan leader Dost Mohammad with the former leader Shah Shuja, pro-British but unpopular among the Afghans. In 1841, Dost Mohammed’s son Mohammed Akbar led successful negotiations to expel the British from Afghanistan, but nearly the entire British force perished on the long road from Kabul to Jalalabad due to a combination of freezing weather and Afghan rebel forces.

After the first Anglo-Afghan war, historian Martin Ewans cites pre-war Afghan respect for Christians and positive relations with the West and laments that, “The war changed all this: British and other foreigners were henceforth distrusted as potential aggressors and despised as infidel and immoral people. Xenophobia became ingrained in the national outlook and Afghanistan retreated into what has been described as ‘nearly a century of stultifying isolation’. The consequent setback for the country’s development is unquantifiable, but must nonetheless have been considerable.”

Power changed hands and the British fought two more wars with the Afghans in 1880 and 1919. Under the leadership of Amanullah, Afghanistan finally made peace with the British and officially declared itself an independent nation. A British government official described the new Afghan nation as “impregnated with the world-spirit of self-determination and national freedom, inordinately self-confident in its new-found emancipation from autocracy and in its supposed escape from Russia, impatient of any restrain on its absolute independence.” Amanullah made many social, economic, and political reforms in Afghanistan, attempting to secularize and modernize the nation. His advocacy for women’s rights sparked much debate among the Afghan people and threatened traditional tribal and religious leaders. Some historians believe these reforms caused his ultimate downfall.

The next leader, Nadir Shah, retracted Amanullah’s reforms, reinstating Islamic law and restrictions on women. However, he wrote a new constitution that lasted for thirty years and contained elements of democracy with a bi-cameral parliament but supreme power for the king. Nadir Shah stabilized Afghanistan and introduced many economic reforms with the goal of industrialization. The country’s main crop became cotton.

After World War II, during which Afghanistan had remained neutral, the nation was struggling economically and asked the US for support. The American Government refused to provide assistance, so Afghanistan was forced to go to a US company that came in to build a big infrastructure project. The Afghan government quickly ran out of money and the project lay unfinished.

Politically, Afghanistan has been ruled by short dynasties of kings. Yet, as early British observers point out, these kings typically did not exert much power, especially in rural areas. Afghanistan has largely remained tribal with decisions being made by local leaders and more significant decisions being made by a tribal jirga, or council of elders from all regions of the country. One observer went so far as to say that any power that could unite these regions would be so strong that it would crush them. This indicates that Afghanistan needs a decentralized power structure focused in villages where leaders know exactly what their people need. However, this increases the likelihood of corruption, specifically the trend of omnipotent warlords.

Another historical trend that jumps out is the xenophobia of Afghans, as eloquently relayed by historian Martin Ewans. Before the meddling of the British, Afghans welcomed and respected outsiders. After fighting with the British for decades, the Afghan people lost all regard for foreigners, especially Westerners. Even after negotiating peace with the British, they tended to balk at international involvement and possessed a deep distrust of the British. The Americans did not start off on the right foot either with their refusal to help the Afghans after World War II. Thus foreign powers must be exceedingly careful with any involvement and must include the Afghan in all decision making processes.

Socially, women have tossed back and forth between rulers who championed women’s rights to those who arrested religious leaders for telling all women to follow the purdah and cover their faces. In the early 20^th century, Afghans rebelled against social reforms. In the mid-20^th century, Afghans embraced modernization. They would all at least like the right to choose their own way of life.

Economically, Afghanistan has long struggled. Cotton and other agricultural crops have been successful in the past and have good potential, but the economy desperately needs to move more fully into the secondary and tertiary sectors and focus on manufacturing and services. The presence of poppy farms producing opium provides the greatest amount of revenue currently, so a more legitimate industry must undercut opium by being more profitable.

First Anglo-Afghan War

In the initial stage of our study, Betsy and I studied the history of Afghanistan. We began our studies in mid-1700s with the commencement of the leadership of Ahmad Khan, who is responsible for expanding the territories of Afghanistan to most of its present boundaries. The study of the history concludes with the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. In the next few posts we will be describing major historic events and their significance. The first such event is the First Anglo-Afghan war.

Afghan history is plagued by family and tribal rivalries over supreme control of the territories of Afghanistan. Most of these disputes were domestic. The first major conflict that involved the forces of a foreign agent was the first Anglo-Afghan war. The war is a significant point in Afghan history, because for the first time in many centuries a foreign force penetrated through the layers of various tribal leaders and took control of Kabul. The first Anglo-Afghan war is an important event to note while studying the nature of the conflict of Afghanistan, because it is the first impression in the minds of Afghanis of foreign intervention into their lands.

The first Anglo-Afghan war emerged as a result of the Great Game, which is the power struggle between the Russian and British empires over Afghanistan. The Great Game raged on in the first half of the nineteenth century. Afghanistan became an important aspect of the conflict between the two empires, because it separated the Russian Empire from India, British territory. The Russians wanted to provide themselves with a land route to India, but the British wanted Afghanistan to act as its protective barrier against Russia. To achieve their respective goals, both parties conducted many negotiations with Afghan leaders. Between 1832 and 1838, Russian negotiators created an alliance with Muhammad Mirza, a Persian Shah. The British sought a partnership with Dost Muhammad, ruler of Afghanistan. Shah Mirza gained more influence than Dost Muhammad in Afghanistan. This power shift made the British uneasy, because the Russians were in a better position in the region.

As a result of the little Russian success in the region, the British decided to invade Afghanistan. The East Trading Company used the following rationale for their decision to intervene with force in Afghanistan: they feared that the Russians would spread into India; they believed that a strong British presence in Kabul is the key to stopping the Russians; lastly, British control of Afghanistan could provide Great Britain with means of infiltrating the Central Asian market. So, on October first, 1989, Lord Auckland declared war through the Simla Manifesto, which stated East India Company’s intents and reasons for their military action.

The British forces succeeded in the conquest of Afghanistan and put Shuja Shah in power. Shuja Shah was not able to keep Afghanistan stable and in British control. Shuja was not popular among the people and lacked the sufficient monetary resources for a decent enough army to control the region and withstand Russian attacks. During Shuja’s reign, some rebellions occurred but were put down by the British Kandahar garrison. One important means of maintaining some stability of the region was bribing tribal warriors, but in the fall of 1841, the British cut the budget for bribing tribal leaders. This simple decision led to massive bloody uprisings and the assassinations of Burnes, a British officer, and of Macnaghten, Shuja’s advisor. As a result of the slaughter of their Kandahar garrison, the British forces retreated.

The British intervention into Afghanistan had many consequences. The East Trading Company lost a lot of money, approximately 20 million British pounds. Additionally the company and Great Britain lost credibility, and the company lost army recruits. The sudden retreat of the British left the region in total anarchy. Additionally some historians believe that the British retreat spurred the Indian War for Independence. Lastly, the British retreat allowed Dost Muhammad to regain control of Afghanistan.

As the first act of direct foreign military intervention, the first Anglo-Afghan War exposed the Afghan people to foreign intervention in general. Due to the brash decisions of the British and their quick retreat, the first Anglo-Afghan War painted a dark picture for all of future foreign interventions and created a general negative opinion of any foreign influence on the domestic and international affairs of Afghanistan. The British did so by entering the and exiting Afghanistan swiftly and by not assessing the domestic situation of Afghanistan fully before entering.

Aigerim's Policy Recommendation

As Betsy mentioned in our previous blog entry, we want to start out our project by asserting our current opinions on what should be done in Afghanistan today through a general policy recommendation. Here is my current recommendation and general stance on the situation in Afghanistan:

Since the early nineteenth century, foreign agents hindered the stability and growth of Afghanistan and debased its chance to become a free and sovereign state: first the British, then the Soviets and now the United States and other influential western nations. None of these foreign powers gave Afghanistan a chance to develop itself economically, socially or politically. Due to the lack of time and independence for the Afghans to create their own political and legislative system, Afghanistan never had a chance for modern stability.

To create a stable society in Afghanistan, foreign forces should not influence the creation of any political, economic, legislative or social structures of Afghanistan. Instead, they should provide Afghanistan with the means of holding peaceful debates and discussions on what policies the “new” Afghanistan should implement. Complete restructuring of all existing government structures is the main priority for creating a stable state out of Afghanistan. It is essential that any new policies or laws come from the people of Afghanistan, because if they come up with guidelines for themselves, they would believe in them more and follow them. At the same time, the collaboration of all the people of Afghanistan would also create a feeling of camaraderie and unity.

Due to the population size of Afghanistan, approximately 30,000,000 people, it would be impossible to give each citizen of Afghanistan a direct voice in the restructuring, which is why debates must occur at local levels first. They should begin on a town basis for rural areas and a district level for bigger cities. Then every single town would elect a representative that would then go on to represent their town in a regional assembly, which would consist of an agglomeration of approximately ten to thirty towns. Lastly, each of the regional assemblies would elect a representative to a national assembly, a collection of representatives from each of the regional assemblies. The national assembly would then convene to write a new constitution for Afghanistan. Afterwards, the people of Afghanistan would vote on the proposed constitution, and it would only come into effect if 2/3 of Afghanistan vote for it. If this constitution fails, the process will go through the same town to region to nation cycle until a proposed constitution succeeds.

The role of foreign governments to aid Afghanistan should be in helping it to create a new constitution by providing Afghanistan with security for all the assembly meetings and by bringing in foreign observers to ensure fair constitution voting. Lastly, if this process works, and the people of Afghanistan create a new constitution for themselves, foreign presence in Afghanistan will be up to the will of the newly created government. At the current moment, foreign nations currently involved in Afghanistan must spark political activism in Afghanistan and allow the people of Afghanistan to exchange their ideas of an ultimate government for themselves.

These are just my initial thoughts on what should be done. I do expect some of my ideas to change by the completion of this independent study.

Betsy's Policy Recommendation

We are starting with historical background up through the Soviet invasion in 1979. To start off, we will share our current perspective on Afghanistan with policy recommendations. At the end of the semester, we will update our recommendation to reflect what we have learned. Here is mine:

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 as a response to 9/11. We must not just pack our bags and leave the Afghans to pick up the pieces. America has a responsibility to finish the job we started. We must keep our combat troops in Afghanistan until al Qaeda and the Taliban have been thoroughly extinguished. America and the international community should set a goal of defeating these dangerous groups by 2016. At that point, if and only if combat success has been achieved, combat troops should pull out while some troops remain to keep the peace and continue to train Afghan forces to care for their own country.

As combat continues in the south (Kandahar), multilateral powers must invest in the infrastructure of northern and eastern Afghanistan. Afghanistan companies should receive contracts to build roads, schools, public transportation systems, and hydroelectric dams. This will stimulate the Afghan economy while simultaneously building the infrastructure needed for the economy to function. Private foreign companies must help defeat poverty by investing in Afghanistan through building factories and making micro-loans to poor entrepreneurs. We must fight poverty and violence together to break the vicious cycle.

Afghanistan historically has functioned as a monarchy, but rarely without infighting or iron rule. Most villages retain a tribal system with a village 'chief'. Afghanistan's history indicates that a pure democracy will not solve any problems. One idea would be to let each village elect a council with a leader who would then be part of a provincial council the leader of which would represent his/her province on a regional council from which a leader would represent his/her region on a national council. In the provincial, regional, and national councils, leaders would be elected by council vote. In this way, Afghans can retain the tribal system and decentralization they are comfortable with while still having a say in the way their country is run.

Without delving into the complicated history, politics, economics, and social structure of Afghanistan, I would suggest the above. After a semester of study, I may believe differently.

Welcome

On September 11, 2001 Afghanistan was dragged onto the world stage after years of obscurity since the Soviet invasion. Americans searched for answers to this act of terrorism-- where was Afghanistan, anyway? As President Obama tries to wrap up the war in Afghanistan, we hope to learn more about this country which has been mired in conflict for so long. How has Afghanistan's history of conflict shaped the country today? How should the government be structured? What are the next steps for the United States?

Betsy Ray is a native of Washington, DC and Aigerim Saudabayeva was born in Kazakhstan but has lived in the DC area since she was eleven. In this blog, we will chronicle our thoughts throughout our independent project this semester on the evolution of conflict in Afghanistan.