After years of Mogul and Safavid rule, in the mid-1750’s Ahmed Shah Durrani consolidated the Afghan kingdom which stretched from the Amu Darya to the Arabian Sea and from East of Mashad to Delhi in the West at its height. George Foster, a well-traveled British East India Company official, described the relationship between the Afghan Pushtoons and their rulers:
“The government of the Afghans must ever receive a weighty bias from the genius of their ruler, and the degree of authority he may possess. But when not constrained, as in the present reign, by some extraordinary power or capacity of the prince, they disperse into societies, and are guided by the ruder principles of the feudal system. Conformably to this system, the different chieftains usually reside in fortified villages, where they exercise an acknowledged, though moderate, sway over their vassals, and yield a careless obedience to the orders of government. Rarely any appeal is made to the head of state, except in cases which may involve a common danger; when I have seen the authority of the Shah interposed with success.
Fifty years later, Montstuart Elphinstone, another British East India Company official, compared the Afghan kingdom to Scotland: “the direct power of the King over the towns and the country immediately around; the precarious submission of the nearest clans, and the independence of the remote ones; the inordinate power and faction of the nobility most connected with the court; and the relations borne by all the great lords to the crown. . . There is reason to fear that the societies into which the nation is divided, possess within themselves a principle of repulsion and disunion, too strong to be overcome, except by such a force as, while it united the whole into one solid body, would crush and obliterate the features of every one of the parts. . . the internal government of the tribes answers its end so well, that the utmost disorders of the royal government never derange its operations, nor disturb the lives of the people. A number of organized and high-spirited republics are ready to defend their rugged country against a tyrant; and are able to defy the feeble efforts of a party in a civil war.”
He described the people: “Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighborhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit”
Afghanistan’s issues with the British began in the late 1820’s: concerned about growing Russian influence, the British told the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, “to watche more closely than has hitherto been attempted the progress of events in Afghanistan and to counteract the progress of Russian influence.” The British in India took this mission very seriously, invading Afghanistan in 1838. Auckland aimed “to raise up an insurmountable and . . . lasting barrier to all encroachments from the Westward, and to establish a basis for the extension and maintenance of British influence throughout po9oCentral Asia.” Afghanistan was to be a buffer state.
In the first Anglo-Afghan war from 1838 to 1841, the British replaced Afghan leader Dost Mohammad with the former leader Shah Shuja, pro-British but unpopular among the Afghans. In 1841, Dost Mohammed’s son Mohammed Akbar led successful negotiations to expel the British from Afghanistan, but nearly the entire British force perished on the long road from Kabul to Jalalabad due to a combination of freezing weather and Afghan rebel forces.
After the first Anglo-Afghan war, historian Martin Ewans cites pre-war Afghan respect for Christians and positive relations with the West and laments that, “The war changed all this: British and other foreigners were henceforth distrusted as potential aggressors and despised as infidel and immoral people. Xenophobia became ingrained in the national outlook and Afghanistan retreated into what has been described as ‘nearly a century of stultifying isolation’. The consequent setback for the country’s development is unquantifiable, but must nonetheless have been considerable.”
Power changed hands and the British fought two more wars with the Afghans in 1880 and 1919. Under the leadership of Amanullah, Afghanistan finally made peace with the British and officially declared itself an independent nation. A British government official described the new Afghan nation as “impregnated with the world-spirit of self-determination and national freedom, inordinately self-confident in its new-found emancipation from autocracy and in its supposed escape from Russia, impatient of any restrain on its absolute independence.” Amanullah made many social, economic, and political reforms in Afghanistan, attempting to secularize and modernize the nation. His advocacy for women’s rights sparked much debate among the Afghan people and threatened traditional tribal and religious leaders. Some historians believe these reforms caused his ultimate downfall.
The next leader, Nadir Shah, retracted Amanullah’s reforms, reinstating Islamic law and restrictions on women. However, he wrote a new constitution that lasted for thirty years and contained elements of democracy with a bi-cameral parliament but supreme power for the king. Nadir Shah stabilized Afghanistan and introduced many economic reforms with the goal of industrialization. The country’s main crop became cotton.
After World War II, during which Afghanistan had remained neutral, the nation was struggling economically and asked the US for support. The American Government refused to provide assistance, so Afghanistan was forced to go to a US company that came in to build a big infrastructure project. The Afghan government quickly ran out of money and the project lay unfinished.
Politically, Afghanistan has been ruled by short dynasties of kings. Yet, as early British observers point out, these kings typically did not exert much power, especially in rural areas. Afghanistan has largely remained tribal with decisions being made by local leaders and more significant decisions being made by a tribal jirga, or council of elders from all regions of the country. One observer went so far as to say that any power that could unite these regions would be so strong that it would crush them. This indicates that Afghanistan needs a decentralized power structure focused in villages where leaders know exactly what their people need. However, this increases the likelihood of corruption, specifically the trend of omnipotent warlords.
Another historical trend that jumps out is the xenophobia of Afghans, as eloquently relayed by historian Martin Ewans. Before the meddling of the British, Afghans welcomed and respected outsiders. After fighting with the British for decades, the Afghan people lost all regard for foreigners, especially Westerners. Even after negotiating peace with the British, they tended to balk at international involvement and possessed a deep distrust of the British. The Americans did not start off on the right foot either with their refusal to help the Afghans after World War II. Thus foreign powers must be exceedingly careful with any involvement and must include the Afghan in all decision making processes.
Socially, women have tossed back and forth between rulers who championed women’s rights to those who arrested religious leaders for telling all women to follow the purdah and cover their faces. In the early 20th century, Afghans rebelled against social reforms. In the mid-20th century, Afghans embraced modernization. They would all at least like the right to choose their own way of life.
Economically, Afghanistan has long struggled. Cotton and other agricultural crops have been successful in the past and have good potential, but the economy desperately needs to move more fully into the secondary and tertiary sectors and focus on manufacturing and services. The presence of poppy farms producing opium provides the greatest amount of revenue currently, so a more legitimate industry must undercut opium by being more profitable.