What Brought Down Daoud’s Careful Manipulation of Soviet and American Aid?

In the midst of the Cold War, the USSR and the US competed against each other to win over any neutral state. One of the main means of influencing a state’s political position in the polarized Cold War world consisted of financial and in some cases military aid. Afghanistan under Prime Minister, Dauod, utilized its neutral political position to maximize the inflow of aid into its domestic economy and thus sustaining it. The aid coming from the two superpowers consisted of infrastructure, education and military support. The approaches of the USSR and the US differed in many ways. In the end, the Soviet efforts won over the Afghan government due to the Pashtunistan conflict. Overall, Daoud managed to balance the influx of Soviet and American aid to modernize Afghanistan to his best abilities, but a territorial conflict with Pakistan forced Daoud and the Afghan government to favor the Soviets over the Americans.

In a way by taking advantage of the Soviet and American Cold War rivalry, Daoud managed to improve Afghanistan’s infrastructure but at the cost of destabilizing and weakening its domestic economy. By the 1960s, foreign aid made up more than 40% of the Afghan state budget[1]. It was estimated in the early 1960s that the US was spending close to15 dollars per Afghan[2]. Overall, the USSR invested approximately 700 million dollars while the US invested about 300 million dollars[3]. By letting such a big volume of foreign aid flow into the domestic Afghan economy, Daoud fostered a high dependence on an external source of financing. Most of the welfare and social policies implemented by the Afghan government in the 50s and the 60s was heavily subsidized by American and Soviet money. This high dependence did not allow the Afghan economy to develop in a sustainable matter. In 1968, a “Time” article mentioned that: “both Moscow and Washington have come to feel that the Afghans must do more to help themselves and bring to an end a situation in which 80 % of development funds comes from foreign sources[4].”

Despite deteriorating the Afghan economy, Daoud’s manipulation of the Cold War rivalry resulted in many projects that benefited Afghanistan. The USSR built an airport in Kabul while the US built one in Kandahar. Additionally, both superpowers constructed grand highways including the world’s largest road tunnel[5]. Most of the USSR’s roadways focused on the North and thus connected Afghanistan’s major cities to Soviet territories. The US, on the other hand, built roads in the South to provide access to India and Pakistan, a US ally[6]. In addition, the USSR supplied Afghanistan with oil and built grain elevators and bakeries in an effort to stimulate the Afghan economy by creating jobs[7].

The cooperation of Soviet and American aid orchestrated by Daoud lasted for approximately two decades. Some major problems arose. The Helmand Project originally begun as a partnership between the Afghan, Japanese and German governments in the 1930s, but the political circumstances of World War II halted the project. In 1945, the Afghan government decided to re-launch the Helmand project with the help of an American company, the Morrison-Knudsen. The project was significant due to its grandeur. The series of irrigation canals built as part of this endeavor were supposed to attract the nomadic population of Afghanistan to settle and to cultivate the land in the Helmand Valley. The Helmand Valley project failed and left Afghanistan in a large debt. In order to go through with the project the Afghan government took out a 21 million dollar loan from the Export-Import-Bank in Washington, DC. The project was unsuccessful due to a lot of factors. The main factor consisted of the quality of the soil. After attempting to farm the newly irrigated land, the settled nomads found their old ways to be more financially sustainable[8]. In addition to the Helmand Valley Project, despite doubling the number of schools in three years in Afghanistan, the literacy rate was 7% and only 12% school-age children attended a school. Even though the number of doctors in Afghanistan increased at the time the ratio of doctors to Afghans was 1 to25,000[9].

Though many destabilizing factors played a role in tarring Daoud’s policy of playing off of the Soviet-American rivalry, the issue of Pashtunistan tipped the balance between the American and Soviet support that Daoud sustained during most of his 1953 to 1963 rule. Shortly after gaining their independence, Pakistan declared the Durand Line, a boundary used by the British which separated British India and Afghanistan, as its official international border with Afghanistan[10]. Afghanistan supported the claim made by the Pathan people to create an autonomous state, Pashtunistan, on the land of the Durand Line[11].To aid in the creation of Pashtunistan and to defend Afghanistan from a potential armed conflict with Pakistan, Daoud needed to strengthen this army. In 1944, the Afghan government asked the US for military support; the request was denied. The Afghan government kept requesting US military aid unsuccessfully up until the early 1950s. After many attempts, a Loya Jirga, Afghan Grand Assembly, accepted Soviet military aid in 1955[12]. Additionally, in 1956 Daoud received a 500 million dollar loan from the Soviet Union to fund the modernization and the strengthening of the Afghan army[13]. These decisions marked the end of the neutral Afghanistan era. After accepting a large amount of military aid from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan distanced itself from the US. The closure of the Pashtunistan issue also marked the end of Daoud’s first reign over Afghanistan.

Daoud’s first ten year reign is marked by his ability to balance and control the relationship between the US and the USSR in favor of his nation. Through his policies, Daoud improved Afghan infrastructure immensely, but he let his country rely on too much foreign aid thus leaving Afghanistan unable to take care of itself. Additionally, while, many projects such as the Kandahar and the Kabul airports were successful, this period of time was not unmarked by failure. The Helmand Valley wasted a lot of Afghan financial resources and did not produce any results. Lastly, Daoud failed to retain Afghanistan’s neutrality in a political conflict, Pashtunistan; Afghanistan’s position on the Pashtunistan issue ruined the balance of the American and Soviet aid in Afghanistan.

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[1] Jonathan Goodhand, "Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan"

[2] “Afghanistan: Two-Way Stretch," Time, July 14, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,87602,00.html.

[3] "Afghanistan: Kingly Accomplishment," Time, December 3, 1965, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,842252,00

[4] "Afghanistan: History v. Progress," Time, September 20, 1968, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,838742,00

[5] "Afghanistan: Kingly Accomplishment," Time, December 3, 1965, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,842252,00

[6] "Afghanistan: The High-Wire Man," Time, October 5, 1959, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,89427,00.html

[7] "Afghanistan: Toward the Khyber," Time, September 17, 1956, , http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,893546,00.html

[8] Omar Zakhiwal, "The Helmand Valley Project," Institute for Afghan Studies

[9] "Afghanistan: History v. Progress," Time, September 20, 1968, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,838742,00

[10] Walid Majid, "Prime Minister Daoud's Relationship with Washington (1953-1963)," Institue for Afghan Studies”

[11] “Afghanistan: Two-Way Stretch," Time, July 14, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,87602,00.html.

[12] Walid Majid, "Prime Minister Daoud's Relationship with Washington(1953-1963)," Institue for Afghan Studies”

[13] "Afghanistan: Toward the Khyber," Time, September 17, 1956, http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,893546,00.html

Arming Rebels

With the recent upheaval in Libya and the United States government’s decision to participate in a coalition to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and make select bombing raids aimed to help Libyan rebels, many questions have arisen about aiding rebels. These questions often reference American aid in Afghanistan prior to September 11^th, 2001. Some people claim that the United States actually funded the Taliban, contributing to their rise. To what extent did US involvement in Afghanistan in the 20^th century contribute to the rise of the Taliban? Though the movement began in universities build by Americans decades earlier and the US funded Afghanistan’s mujahidin, the US government never directly funded the Taliban, though its actions in the region may have contributed to the Taliban’s rise.

In the 1950’s, the Soviet Union was funding large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, hoping to curry favor with the government and people in the fight to spread communism. The US quickly realized the Soviet Union’s intentions and fought back by drastically increasing the amount of aid they gave to Afghanistan. A large portion of this aid came in the form of education. The US government sent professors from top American schools to new universities in Afghanistan as consultants to reform the educational system. Though the US went in with intentions of promoting freedom and democracy, their plans backfired forty years later.

The Taliban movement began among university students as dissatisfaction with the mujahidin government. The US had funded several groups of the mujahidin during the Soviet Invasion in hopes that the “holy warriors” would drive out the Russians. At the end of the decade, the Americans’ plan worked in that the Soviets withdrew all troops from Afghanistan. Yet the “coalition government” formed by tenuous alliances between mujahidin leaders never fully functioned. The word “Taliban” comes from Pashtun for “student.” The Taliban were originally a group of radicalized students, many of whom came from universities built in Afghanistan by the Americans, who wanted a working government and a secure population.

In this way, American funding created an intellectual elite who defied American principles. The Taliban did consolidate power for a centralized government, but they also instituted a reign of terror with their brutality.

Though the US did not directly fund the Taliban in the 1990’s, it did arm the mujahidin in the later 1980’s. Some people cite the mujahidin as the original source for the Taliban, interpreting this relationship as the US promoting the rise of the Taliban would be wrong. One of the factions of the mujahidin, funded by the US during the Soviet invasion, did morph into the Taliban in the early 1990’s—the two groups shared some leaders, members, and ideologies. And the Taliban gained ground quickly, seizing control of Afghanistan in just a few years. Yet one of their biggest rivals was another former mujahidin group, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, Afghan hero idolized for fighting against the Soviets and later against the Taliban.

Thus any claim that US funding of the mujahidin was essentially funding the Taliban can be countered with the fact that US funding of the mujahidin was also funding those who fought against the Taliban. Besides, most of this funding had stopped after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

An American think-tank official said of Libya, “you gotta go with the rebels you got.” Whether he is right or wrong in this case, United States aid in Afghanistan did not lead directly to the rise of the Taliban. Of course, however, Libya is a different situation altogether.